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Abstract 
 
Systemic risk has remained at the nexus of macro-
financial research and policymaking in most parts of 
the world. Much of the attention has focused on 
understanding implication of the interconnectedness of 
financial markets. Instead of focusing only on 
networks, we use and test the utility of network 
structures in a novel way. We use RiskRank as a 
framework to test the use of networks of financial 
systems, and particularly focus on testing the utility of 
the network dimension of common exposures (funding 
composition and portfolio overlap). RiskRank provides 
an ideal playground for testing the extent to which 
direct and common exposures perform in capturing 
transmission of financial crises. The results in this 
paper highlight the importance of common exposures. 
We show that funding and portfolio composition 
overlap are significant channels of contagion and 
should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The global financial crisis triggered a large number 
of efforts on different types of systemic risk (cf. Allen 
and Gale, 2000; Acharya, 2009), including macro-
financial imbalances, exogenous aggregate shocks and 
contagion risk. While systemic risk is oftentimes 
divided into cyclical and cross-sectional components 
(Borio, 2011), a plethora of articles have focused on 
the latter of the two, i.e., the interconnectedness of 
financial systems. This paper postulates, and tests, the 
utility of measuring portfolio overlap, as well as tests 
to what extent it helps in identifying risks at the 
country level. 
Many authors calculate from market prices the 
quantiles of the estimated loss probability distribution 
of a bank, conditional on the occurrence of an extreme 
event in the financial market. Examples of articles 
trying to capture systemic risk from market prices 
include Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), Brownlees and Engle (2012), 
Acharya et al. (2012), Banulescu and Dumitrescu 
(2015) and Hautsch et al. (2014). The above studies 
rely on a bivariate approach, which allow calculating 
the risk of an institution conditional on another or on a 
reference market but does not address the issue of how 
risks are transmitted between different institutions in a 
multivariate framework. To address the multivariate 
nature of systemic risk, a large number of studies have 
made use of correlation network models (see, e.g., 
Lorenz et al. (2009); Battiston et al. (2012)). Some 
early studies include Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2014), after which extensions by 
Barigozzi and Brownlees (2014) and Ahelegbey et al. 
(2016) introduce stochastic graphical models. 
In contrast to the literature on correlation networks 
that targets the dependence structure in market prices, 
this paper measures correlation in network structures. 
As pointed out by Brunetti et al. (2015), correlations in 
network structures hold promise for assessing common 
exposures and complement direct linkages. Giudici et 
al. (2017) test measures of common exposures in the 
context of market prices, and does not put forward a 
generalized approach to this testing framework. This 
paper sheds additional light on this problem, in the 
context of national interbank markets. Further, this 
paper provides a test between direct and common 
exposures as a measure of risks prior to financial crises 
with a general purpose tool, RiskRank.  A large 
number of studies have assessed network structures of 
interbank markets using the Bank of International 
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Settlements (BIS) data set, including Garratt et al. 
(2011), Giudici and Spelta (2016), McGuire and 
Tarashev (2006), Minoiu and Reyes (2013).  
The methodological contribution of this paper is to 
formally compare classical networks and correlation 
based networks, using appropriate predictive 
comparisons. Using the correlation as a measure of 
proximity in a multivariate framework, we provide 
measures of funding composition and portfolio 
similarities. From an applied viewpoint, we shed 
further light on the interpretation of country bilateral 
financial flows data, contained in the BIS statistics. We 
also combine these measures with banking crises, in a 
standard early-warning setup, in order to evaluate 
whether and to what extent they are related to the 
build-up of imbalances prior to crisis events. 
Results suggest the predictive power of direct 
linkages is clearly outperformed by the other ways of 
defining relationships. While linkages based upon 
common exposures and a combination of direct and 
common exposures perform equally well in forecasting 
crisis episodes, the predictive power obtained 
combining the two type of network is superior for a 
certain parameter range. This highlights the importance 
of common exposures. From an economic point of 
view, this clearly shows that common exposures, or so-
called funding/portfolio composition overlap, indeed 
are channels of contagion and should be accounted for 
when measuring systemic risk. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the portfolio overlap methods used and 
Section 3 the crisis signaling and signal evaluation 
methods adopted. While Section 4 describes the 
empirical exercise in the network structure, Section 5 
presents the results of comparing our exposure 
measures in terms of performance in signaling a crisis 
through the RiskRank measure. Finally, Section 6 
contains some concluding remarks and future research 
directions. 
 
 
2. Networks and portfolio overlap 
methodology 
 
This section presents the methods used for 
estimating portfolio overlap. We can represent a 
network by the means of a graph G=(V;E) consisting 
of a set V of $n$ vertices and a set E of m edges. A 
weight wi,j, (with i,j=1,...,m) can possibly be associated 
to each edge (i;j) and then a weighted (or valued) 
graph is defined. 
After the recent crisis, it has been argued that 
network theory will enhance the understanding of 
financial systems, systemic risk, and the 
comprehension of the factors causing failures in 
financial markets. Usually, the financial systems are 
approached studying the connections among financial 
institutions. This is done through measuring banking 
liabilities and claims because credit interlinkages are 
inherently important for propagating, absorbing or 
magnifying shocks. Even if a topology of a network is 
known to play a major role in robustness against 
shocks, the lack of bilateral data have prevented the 
systematical investigation of the topological properties 
of the international financial network. Always when 
data are missing or confidential, correlation based 
networks seem to be a better alternative to classical 
network models. While the literature has focused on 
dependence structures among market prices, the focus 
in this paper is on correlations in network structures. 
Correlation networks can be used when analyzing 
the structure of pairwise correlations among a set of N 
time series. The proximity measure is defined as 
follows: 
          (1) 
where Ci,j is the correlation coefficient between the 
two time series si and sj in a given time window. The 
topological analysis of the international financial 
network needs to be developed. In order to do so we 
will use the following procedure: we will associate 
different the time series with the different nodes of a 
network. Each pair of nodes can be thought to be 
connected by an edge, with weights that can be related 
to the correlation coefficient between the two 
corresponding time series. A proximity network of n 
nodes can be derived by its associated n × n matrix of 
proximities D a weighted adjacency matrix, with 
elements di,j described by equation 1. Now the network 
is obtained and the following step is to describe a node 
centrality with an interconnectedness summary 
measure. This task is done to describe and to provide 
an indicator that can act as a measure of systemic 
importance. 
In this paper, the set of nodes represent countries, 
while the set of edges depends on value that defines the 
link. The aim of the paper is to study and to compare 
networks of direct flows between countries' banking 
sectors with common exposure networks based on 
correlations between streams of loans. A link between 
two countries in a direct network represents a flow of 
funds, in millions of dollars, between a borrower and a 
lender. A link in a common exposure network, instead, 
measures the similarity between the funding 
composition or between the portfolio allocations of two 
countries, depending on whether in-flows or out-flows 
are used to compute the correlations. While in a direct 
network the links are directional, from a lender to a 
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borrower, in common exposure networks they are 
undirected, and they are computed starting from the 
correlation between the in-flows and out-flows of a 
country with respect to all other countries. 
 
 
3. Crisis signaling and signal evaluation 
methodology 
 
It is possible to use standard approaches from crisis 
signaling with the purpose of testing to what extent 
direct and indirect exposures affects the overall level of 
stress in the banking sector. Crisis signaling and Early-
warning models are used to divide economies into pre-
crisis and tranquil ones. This will result into a two-
class classification problem, which is a generic 
problem formulation in machine learning. We are 
aiming for a model that separates vulnerable and 
tranquil classes to discriminate between them by 
estimating the probability of being in a vulnerable 
state. It is also important to take into consideration the 
time-series dimension, when testing the predictive 
power of the models. Therefore, recursive real-time 
out-of-sample tests to assess performance will be 
taken. This implies that a new model is created at each 
quarter using the information available then. We need 
also to consider publication lags and the information in 
a realistic manner.  
 
 
Table 1. A contingency matrix 
 
In order to have comparable results, we will use the 
evaluation framework for early-warning models in 
(Sarlin, 2013), and mimicking an ideal leading 
indicator  for observation n (where 
n=1,2,...,N) and forecast horizon h, meaning that we 
have a binary indicator that is one during vulnerable 
periods and zero otherwise. For detecting events Cn, 
we will use a continuous measure indicating 
membership in a vulnerable state . We will 
then change it into a binary prediction Bn that takes the 
value one if pn exceeds a specified threshold 
and zero otherwise. The relationship between 
the prediction Bn and the ideal leading indicator Cn can 
then be summarized into a contingency matrix, as 
found in Table 1. In terms of the elements of the 
contingency matrix, we can differentiate between two 
different types of classification errors that a decision 
maker may be concerned with: missing crises and 
issuing false alarms. The next step is to define the 
concepts of usefulness and relative usefulness for the 
classification performance (as found in Sarlin, 2013).  
The process will define type I errors (the share of 
missed crises to the frequency of crises, i.e. 
T1=FN/(FN+TP)) and type II errors (the share of 
issued false alarms to the frequency of tranquil periods, 
i.e. T2=FP/(TN+FP)). The following step is to obtain 
the policymakers' relative preference between type I 
and II errors (μ) to account for the potentially 
imbalanced costs of errors and the unconditional 
probabilities of crises P1 and tranquil periods P2 to 
account for the potential difference in the size of the 
two classes. Based on these values, we can define the 
loss function as: 
          (2) 
The absolute usefulness of the model can be specified 
by comparing it to using the best guess of a 
policymaker (always or never signaling depending on 
class frequency and preferences): 
          (3) 
The final step is to calculate Ur and to compare the 
absolute usefulness of the model to the absolute 
usefulness of a model with perfect performance L(μ)=0 
We also strive to assess the predictive performance 
through calculating standard measures from the 
classification and machine learning literature, using the 
area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve (AUC). These measures take into consideration 
the preferences of a policymaker as well as more 
general-purpose measures to assess model 
performance. Other performance measures to be used 
in assessing the model include: (i) precision of signals 
TP/(FP+TP); this is the share of correct signals to the 
frequency of signals; (ii) precision of tranquil 
predictions TN/(FN+TN), i.e. the share of correct 
silence in tranquil times to the frequency of predicting 
tranquil time; (iii) recall of signals TP/(FN+TP), i.e. 
the share of correct signals to the frequency of crisis 
times; (iv) recall of tranquil predictions TN/(FP+TN), 
i.e. the share of correct silence in tranquil times to the 
frequency of tranquil times; (v) accuracy of the model 
TP+TN/(FN+FP+TN+TP), i.e. the share of correct 
classifications.  
 
 
4. Network data calculations 
  
This section compares the use of direct exposures 
with common exposures in a predictive model of 
systemic banking crises. In short, we let vulnerability 
pass-through networks, where links are defined as 
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direct and common exposures, and compare their 
predictive performance. To start with, we introduce 
crisis signaling as a task as well as an evaluation 
exercises around the task. Then, we move ahead to an 
empirical investigation of European crises. 
For networks, the main data source in this paper is 
statistics from the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS). The International Banking Statistics comprises 
consolidated banking statistics (CBS). CBS capture 
worldwide consolidated claims of banks headquartered 
in many countries, including claims of their own 
foreign affiliates but excluding interoffice positions. 
The dataset above is based upon measures used by 
banks from their internal risk management systems. 
This dataset typically include data on off-balance sheet 
exposures (risk transfers, guarantees and credit 
commitments). 
We employ the consolidated banking statistics on 
ultimate risk basis that are based on the country where 
the ultimate risk or obligor resides, after taking into 
account risk transfers. We have also taken into 
consideration the fact that the statistics capture 
worldwide consolidated positions of the banks thus, the 
CBS reporting area is not synonymous of the location 
of the banking offices within the dataset. A reporting 
country should consolidate the positions of all banking 
entities controlled by a parent institution located in the 
reporting country, thus including banking entities 
which are actually domiciled elsewhere. With reporting 
institutions we mean the financial institutions whose 
business is to receive deposits, or close substitutes for 
deposits, and to grant credits or invest in securities on 
their own account. In this way, the set of reporting 
institutions should include not only commercial banks 
but also savings banks, credit unions or cooperative 
credit banks, as well as other financial credit 
institutions. There is a complicated aspect in the fact 
that a number of countries do not report their statistics 
on the asset side (out-flows); we have 15 fully 
reporting countries and more than 240 that do not 
report in our dataset. Another complicating factor is 
found in the time series with varying starting dates and 
of missing values. Therefore we split the analysis of 
the in- and out-flows in two different databases. We 
restrict the analysis to the 33 largest economies in the 
funding side (for which the received loans sum up to 
last 100000 billion dollars for the period from 1998 to 
2013). The time period starts from the third quarter of 
1998 (Q3--1998) to the last quarter of 2013 (Q4--
2013). We are forced to use only 15 reporting countries 
on the investment side, from the third quarter of 1998 
(Q3--1998) to the last quarter of 2013 (Q4-2013). The 
countries selected for in-flows analysis are the 
following: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = 
Belgium, BR = Brazil, CA = Canada, CH = 
Switzerland, CN = Cina, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = 
Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finalnd, 
FR = France, GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, HK = 
Hong Kong, IE = Ireland, IN = India, IT = Italy, JP = 
Japan, KR = South Korea, KY = Cayman Islands, LU 
= Luxemburg, MX = Mexico, NL = The Netherlands, 
NO = Norway, NZ = New Zeland, PL = Poland, PT = 
Portugal, RU = Russia, SE = Sweden, SG = Singapore, 
US = United State. The countries selected for out-flows 
analysis are the following: AT = Austria, AU = 
Australia, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = 
Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FR = France, 
GB = Great Britain, IE = Ireland, JP = Japan, NL = 
The Netherlands, SE = Sweden, TW = Taiwan, US = 
United States. Notice that the proposed strategy is 
consistent with Basel III regulation that look separately 
at the lending and borrowing sides of banks' balance 
sheet in the process of evaluating the systemic 
importance (Board, 2013). 
 
5.  Results - Comparing networks with 
RiskRank 
  
In this section, we compare direct and indirect 
exposures with the RiskRank measure (Mezei and 
Sarlin, 2016). RiskRank uses two inputs: individual 
risk for a set of economies measured by an early-
warning model and interconnectedness across these 
economies. Essentially, this allows measuring the 
vulnerability of an individual economy, accounting for 
both domestic risk as well as risk stemming from 
exposures to other economies. In this exercise, the 
early-warning model follows the approach in 
(Holopainen and Sarlin, 2016). For an early-warning 
model, we need two types of data: crisis events and 
vulnerability indicators. The crisis events are based 
upon the IMF database by \cite{laeven2013systemic}, 
while the vulnerability indicators used include most 
common measures of widespread imbalances, such as 
excessive credit growth, excessive increases in stock 
and house prices, GDP growth, loans to deposits and 
debt service ratio, as well as more structural indicators, 
such as government debt, current account deficits and 
inflation. We use a standard logit model with 14 
macro-financial indicators for 15 European economies 
and a forecast horizon of 5--12 quarters prior to crisis 
events, as is common in the literature. The network 
dimension is measured with BIS International Banking 
Statistics in three ways: direct, indirect (common 
exposures) and combined exposures. This provides 
ample means to compare the three types of networks. 
RiskRank provides a risk measure that combines 
measures of individual risk and interconnectedness. In 
principle, it is nothing else than an aggregation 
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operator for each entity c that aggregates over node 
values (i.e., individual risk) over link values (i.e., 
interconnectedness). Thus, we can write RiskRank as 
follows: 
 
(4) 
where c is the evaluated node and xc is its associated 
node value. In this case, the nodes are countries and 
their values crisis probabilities. Further, I(ci,cj) stands 
for the link between nodes i and j and  v(ci) stands for 
the Shapley-index (average contribution of fixed 
element xi in any subset). 
 
In the following the results of the RiskRank 
comparisons are given (Tables 2-9). Note that the 
tables reports recursive out-of-sample performance for 
the direct network with a forecast horizon of 5-12 
quarters. The table reports in columns the following 
measures to assess the overall performance of the 
models: preferences (μ), optimal threshold (τ), absolute 
(Ua) and relative (Ur) usefulness, and AUC = area 
under the ROC curve (TP rate to FP rate), TP = True 
positives, FP = False positives, TN = True negatives, 
FN = False negatives, Precision of positives (PP) = 
TP/(TP+FP), Recall of positives (RP) = TP/(TP+FN), 
Precision of negatives (PN) = TN/(TN+FN), Recall of 
negatives (RN) = TN/(TN+FP), Accuracy (Acc.) = 
(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN). 
 
 
Table 2. Predictive performance without networks (with countries selected for the in-flows analysis).  
 
 
Table 3. Predictive performance of the direct network (with countries selected for the in-flows analysis). 
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Table 4. Predictive performance of the funding composition similarity network. 
 
 
Table 5. Predictive performance of the combined network for in-flows. 
 
 
Table 6. Predictive performance without network (with countries selected for out-flows analysis). 
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Table 7. Predictive performance of the direct network (with countries selected for out-flows analysis). 
 
 
Table 8. Predictive performance of the portfolio similarity network. 
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Table 9. Predictive performance of the combined network for out-flows. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and future work 
 
Measuring portfolio similarity is a central task 
when modeling systemic risk and interconnectedness 
in financial systems, particularly for complementing 
measures based upon direct exposures. Systemic risk, 
in itself, concerns the risks posed by balance sheet 
relationships and interdependencies among players in a 
system or market, where the failure of a single entity 
can cause a cascading failure, which could potentially 
bring down an entire system or market. These balance 
sheet linkages can be represented by a network that 
describes the mutual relationships between the 
different economical agents involved. In this paper, we 
have focused on measuring portfolio overlap, and 
assessing the utility of common exposures as a channel 
for transmission effects. In our contribution we have 
also shown that correlation network models that aim at 
capturing the multivariate network structure provide 
suitable means for representing the indirect dimension 
of systemic risk through common exposures. We have 
combined our proposed measures with banking crises 
data, in order to assess whether and to what extent they 
are related to the build-up of imbalances prior to crisis 
events. The exercise clearly shows that common 
exposures are an important channel of contagion and 
should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk. 
Future work should cover general development of 
the RiskRank approach to also incorporate dynamic 
iterations and feedback effects. For the specific 
purpose in this paper, one could also think of various 
other types of network linkages that could be used for 
measuring the efficacy of transmission channels.  
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